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Abstract 
A frequent suggestion to increase individualV¶ willingness to take action on climate 
change and to support relevant policies is to highlight its proximal consequences, that is, 
consequences that are close in space and time. However, previous studies that have tested this 
proximising approach have not revealed the expected positive effects on individual action and 
support for addressing climate change. We present three lines of psychological reasoning that 
provide compelling arguments as to why highlighting proximal impacts of climate change 
might not be as effective a way to increase individual mitigation and adaptation efforts as is 
often assumed. Our contextualisation of the proximising approach within established 
psychological research suggests that, depending on the particular theoretical perspective one 
takes to this issue, and on specific individual characteristics suggested by these perspectives, 
proximising can bring about the intended positive effects, can have no (visible) effect, or can 
even backfire. Thus, the effects of proximising are much more complex than is commonly 
assumed. Revealing this complexity contributes to a refined theoretical understanding of the 
role psychological distance plays in the context of climate change and opens up further 
avenues for future research and for interventions. 
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Research on public perceptions of climate change often shows that people, at least in 
Western countries, typically perceive climate change as a distant threat, as something that 
affects strangers, and as something that happens in remote times and places, rather than in the 
here and now1±7 (for an exception, see ref. 8). This perception of climate change as a distant 
threat is problematic because it implies little personal relevance. Low levels of personal 
relevance in turn are problematic because LQGLYLGXDOV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIEHLQJSHUVRQDOO\DWULVN
can be an important motivation to take action against the source of that risk9±14.  
Consistent with this analysis, it has repeatedly been suggested that highlighting the 
proximal consequences of climate change could be an important part of strategies to engage 
and mobilize publics around this issue3,15±20. Although the assumed psychological mechanism 
of proximising is often not verbalised (see also ref. 21, where the term is used to describe a 
discursive strategy in which the speaker presents physically and temporally distant events as 
close and directly relevant to the addressee), the rationale behind proximising climate change 
seems to be that this approach (a) decreases the psychological distance between the issue and 
individuals who could or should act17,22 and, (b) makes the consequences of climate change 
easier to visualise4,23 and more personally relevant24,25. Moreover, proximising climate change 
is believed to increase (emotional) concern16,22,26,27 and the feeling of being personally 
vulnerable23,27; ultimately, these processes are expected to enhance SHRSOH¶VPRWLYDWLRQto 
act3,4,22±24,26,28. The idea of focusing on proximal climate change to increase engagement with 
the issue is also consistent with a general tendency, known as temporal discounting, whereby 
people attach a lesser value to the same outcome if it is seen to be further away in time29,30. 
Despite the common sense appeal of proximising31 and the frequent propositions to 
use this strategy to motivate action against climate change, relatively few studies have 
empirically explored the effect of this strategy. Moreover, the findings from those studies that 
have studied proximising are inconclusive. One line of research that is useful to evaluate the 
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role of proximising is to focus on personal experiences of events that are related to climate 
change. Although climate change is by definition a statistical concept (the average weather 
over several decades32) and can therefore not be experienced directly33, people may still 
experience extreme weather events and considerable change in their local environment. To 
illustrate, one study found that Britons who had recently experienced flooding (a weather-
related phenomenon expected to occur more frequently in Britain because of climate change) 
perceived their local area to be more at risk from climate change, were more concerned about 
climate change impacts, had higher confidence in their ability to mitigate climate change, and 
were more willing to reduce their energy use in order to mitigate climate change than those 
who had not recently experienced flooding26. While some studies have revealed similar 
patterns34±36, other work suggests that experiencing the impacts of extreme weather events 
does not necessarily increase concern and the willingness to respond to climate change37,38.  
The relationships between exposure to extreme weather events and the way people feel 
about climate change and possible response strategies becomes more consistent when an 
additional factor is taken into account: namely, how individuals interpret such ³FOLPDWH
VLJQDOV´27,39. People who report having experienced changes or events in the natural 
environment that they think were caused by climate change are more likely to believe that 
climate change is relevant to their local area and themselves42 than people who did not report 
such experience. More specifically, experiencing phenomena attributed to climate change was 
associated with increased perceptions of personal and local risks from climate change41±43 and 
higher levels of concern and worry about this threat41,42. Last but not least, people who felt 
that they had personally experienced climate change through weather-related events or 
changes were more likely to support mitigation41,42 and adaptation44 measures (for an 
overview, see ref. 27). These findings support the idea that bringing climate change 
psychologically closer can under certain circumstances have the expected motivational 
effects. However, the qualification that experiencing extreme weather events only increases 
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levels of engagement with climate change when people attribute their experiences to climate 
change highlights that additional psychological or ideological processes are at work that 
complicate the effects of such experiences40±42,45±47.  
A crucial question that follows from this analysis is to what extent researchers and 
practitioners can study the relationship between experiences with phenomena that people 
believe to be manifestations of climate change and people's readiness to engage with climate 
change. Many existing studies suffer from a range of methodological constraints simply 
because the researchers have had to capitalise, after the event, on unpredictable phenomena 
that have already occurred. As an alternative, some researchers have tried to induce risk-free 
experiences that are consistent with climate change predictions. For example, increasing the 
room temperature strengthens SHRSOH¶Vbelief in climate change48 and some studies suggest 
that the mere activation of heat-related associations has similar effects49±51. However, to our 
knowledge there is currently no evidence available that these manipulations affect behaviour. 
More importantly, the finding that personal experiences have the most consistent positive 
effects when individuals attribute them to climate change40±43 raises the question of how deep 
and enduring the positive effects of incidental bodily sensations and implicitly activated 
associations are.  
An alternative way to bring climate change closer to people is to reduce the 
psychological distance that people perceive when they think about this issue. Support for this 
idea comes from a study that explored how people perceived climate change relative to 
several dimensions of psychological distance. Concern about climate change increased if 
people were  more certain it was happening, expected it to show effects sooner, and thought it 
was affecting their local area and people similar to themselves28. However, the same study 
found a counter-intuitive UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQUHSRUWHGSV\FKRORJLFDOGLVWDQFHDQGSHRSOH¶V
motivation to act: people who thought of climate change as a distant threat were more 
motivated to act28. Findings from experiments where only psychological distance is varied 
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and everything else is held constant also fail to consistently reveal the expected positive 
effects of proximising. Of the three experimental studies we are aware of, two directly 
compared the effects of relatively proximal and distant descriptions of climate change (texts 
describing regional vs. national climate change trends24; texts, maps, and photographs 
illustrating potential flooding caused by sea-level rise either with reference to the UK city 
where the study was conducted or with reference to continental Europe52). However, these 
studies did not find the expected positive effects of proximising on increased individual 
support for addressing climate change24,52. A third study provided members of the general 
public with information posters describing either one broad global impact of climate change 
(sea levels rising) or a local impact specific to the area they lived in (one of the following 
three: forest fires, beetle infestation, rising sea levels). When climate change was described in 
proximal terms, it increased participaQWV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRDGGUHVVFOLPDWHFKDQJHUHODWLYHWRD
control condition in which no information was provided25. ,QFRQWUDVWSHRSOH¶VHQJDJHPHQW
with climate change did not differ between the globally framed poster and the control 
condition. Because this study did not directly compare the proximal and distant frames, it is 
not possible to draw any conclusions about specific advantages of describing climate change 
in proximal terms relative to a more distant framing.  
In sum, there is some evidence suggesting that people are more concerned about 
climate change and more willing to take action when they have experienced extreme weather-
related events or changes, and when they perceive climate change as psychologically 
proximal. However, attempts to capitalise on these interrelations have so far not consistently 
revealed the hypothesised effects on people's readiness to engage with climate change. The 
missing effects of such proximising may, at first glance, seem counter-intuitive theoretically, 
as well as disappointing practically. However, on closer inspection it becomes obvious that 
there is more complexity to how people engage with climate change than is commonly 
assumed±for example, as exemplified by the finding that the motivational effects of personal 
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experiences are contingent on people attributing these to climate change, something which 
cannot be taken for granted.  
The next sections delve deeper into this complexity by applying three theoretical 
perspectives to the idea of proximising. We show that, depending on the particular theoretical 
perspective one takes to this issue, and on specific individual characteristics suggested by 
these perspectives, proximising can bring about the intended positive effects, can have no 
(visible) effect, or can even backfire.  
 
Information for decision-making  
The first theoretical perspective that can help to understand why proximising may not directly 
LQFUHDVHLQGLYLGXDOV¶ willingness to act on climate change is construal level theory53. In 
contrast to the underlying rationale of the proximising strategy, this theoretical perspective 
does not suggest that thinking about an object or event as proximal rather than distant 
necessarily increases personal relevance ± provided that the event or decision projected into 
the distance will still somehow and sometime become relevant to the individual54,55. Instead, 
construal level theory argues that varying levels of psychological distance (e.g., here vs. far 
away, now vs. in 10 years) influence how people represent objects and events mentally and 
what information they consider when making decisions53. Importantly, this does not mean that 
whether people think of climate change as a proximal or distant issue is irrelevant. Distance 
does play a role in how people relate to climate change and possible responses ± but from the 
perspective of construal level theory the influence of perceived distance is more complex than 
suggested by the rationale behind proximising. 
Construal level theory is based on the assumption that humans can only directly 
experience the present situation, and that everything else needs to be mentally construed. To 
illustrate, directly experiencing a heat wave could mean standing in a crowded bus, being 
aware of the stale air, and feeling the sweat WULFNOLQJGRZQRQH¶Vbody. Experiencing a bus 
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ride like this offers a lot of context-specific information, including sensory reactions. In sum, 
the present situation is rich in details and involves little or no mental construal. In contrast, the 
anticipation of a heat wave in the future does not offer any context-specific information and 
does not create sensory reactions. In this case, it is necessary to mentally construe what 
experiencing a heat wave might look and feel like. The further away an object or event is 
from DSHUVRQ¶Vpresent situation, the more effort is necessary to construe it, and the more 
abstract and generalised the resulting mental representation will be. In simpler terms, this 
means that when people think of an object or event as close versus distant, they form different 
mental representations of it.  
An important function of psychological distance is that this influences what 
information people preferentially attend to when they think about (i.e., construe) an object or 
event, and when they make decisions in relation to these. For example, people who think 
about a policy that is to be implemented in the near future tend to consider concrete 
FLUFXPVWDQWLDOLQIRUPDWLRQVXFKDVRWKHUSHRSOH¶VRSLQLRQs when they evaluate that policy. In 
contrast, people who expect the same policy to be implemented in the more distant future base 
their evaluation on more abstract considerations like their values, which are commonly 
regarded as broad orientations that are relatively stable across time and different situations54. 
The same pattern can also be found with regard to behavioural intentions: When intentions are 
represented in the near future, considerations about how convenient the behaviour is (i.e., 
concrete, situation-specific information) better predicts intentions, whereas personal values 
(i.e., more abstract and generalised information) are better at predicting intentions in the 
distant future56. In other words, construal level theory predicts that thinking about proximal 
versus distant climate change should interact with other things (e.g., concrete and situation-
specific vs. abstract and generalised information) to determine individual responses.  
Relating this line of research to the context of climate change implies that proximising 
can have a variety of effects, depending on what information is routinely called upon when 
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people make decisions that affect the environment. Importantly, working from this 
perspective, there are a number of reasons why proximising might actually have negative 
consequences for action57. First, the focal outcomes that motivate people when they think 
about climate change mitigation or adaptation generally correspond to their broader values 
and goals (e.g., caring about others and the natural environment)58. Following the above 
analysis, people who hold such values will act more in line with them when they think of 
climate change as a distant issue and think about it in abstract terms. In other words, for 
people who hold altruistic and biospheric values, proximising should decrease the tendency to 
act on climate change because it draws their attention away from their values.  
Second, when people are led to think about proximal climate change, they will focus 
more on situation-specific and concrete aspects of possible decisions, for example the relative 
costs and benefits of action or inaction57. 6KLIWLQJSHRSOH¶VIRFXVWRWKHVHDVSHFWVLV
problematic because many of the concrete steps people can take to respond to climate change 
involve real and figurative (e.g., inconvenience, physical effort) costs3,59 but relatively few 
direct or concrete benefits. In other words, if a focus on proximal climate increases the 
salience of costs and inconveniences of mitigation and adaptation options by comparison to 
benefits or conveniences, then proximising may decrease the likelihood of people taking such 
steps57.  
Taken together, this line of thinking offers two important insights that researchers and 
communicators should take notice of. First, reducing the psychological distance of climate 
change should not KDYHDGLUHFWHIIHFWRQSHRSOH¶s overall willingness to act on climate 
change per se. Instead, and second, variations in distance framing should influence what kind 
of information people consider when they make decisions about possible steps to respond to 
climate change. Thus, the effect of proximising should depend on the information that is 
typically relevant when people with a proximal perspective make decisions (i.e., concrete and 
situation-specific information such as whether the steps are inconvenient). 
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From local residents to global citizens  
The second line of reasoning suggests that proximising can under some circumstances 
be an effective strategy to increase action on climate change. More specifically, if an 
individual cares about a proximal place, messages that make threats to the place in question 
salient are likely to increase personal relevance and concern. However, it cannot be taken for 
granted that people care about proximal places and the things that constitute them. 
Reciprocally, it cannot be taken for granted that people do not care about distant places and 
things, and would not take action on behalf of these. 
This becomes obvious, for example, when looking at research into how much people 
care about different places60. This research stems from Environmental and Social Psychology, 
but also cognate disciplines such as Human Geography, Sociology, and Anthropology. It 
shows that one person may, for example, have strong local roots and be extremely attached to 
his neighbourhood or town while being indifferent to regional, national, or international 
concerns. At the other extreme, a second person might travel the world a lot and see herself as 
a global citizen; this second person would be more likely to feel attached to places at larger 
scales such as a continent or even to the planet as a whole31. A third person may feel attached 
to multiple places at various spatial scales61, whereas a fourth person may feel detached at all 
scales62.  
Thus, depending on how people relate to places at different spatial scales (e.g., 
neighbourhood, town, region, country, continent, earth), messages with different spatial foci 
will be more or less relevant to them. A person who is predominantly attached to local places 
will be more concerned about local (i.e., proximal) consequences and more willing to protect 
those places63,64. In contrast, a person who feels attached to the whole planet might be more 
concerned about what happens globally rather than more proximally31. And while a person 
who feels attached to multiple places will be concerned about each of these, a person without 
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any place attachments will never be particularly concerned about what happens to a specific 
place.  
A finer-grained analysis of what a place can mean to a person reveals a similar pattern: 
People care to different extents about the things that constitute a place. For example, some 
people appreciate the natural environment of a specific place and are interested in maintaining 
its integrity65,66. People may also differ in terms of how strongly they like a place because 
they put different values to its symbolic meanings (e.g., its historical or religious 
importance)64. Last but not least, different degrees of fondness for a place may also vary as a 
function of how strongly individuals identify and feel connected with people who live in that 
place.  
To summarize, research by psychologists as well as other social science disciplines 
has shown that people vary in terms of how strongly they feel attached to places and their 
constituents at different spatial scales. In terms of the proximising strategy, this implies that 
the effectiveness of this strategy depends on how closely the entities being threatened by 
proximal climate change correspond to what people care about. That is, the more one is 
attached to a specific proximal place as a whole60, and the more this place includes natural 
elements65,66, symbolic meanings64, and people one cares about and identifies with67,68, the 
more likely one is to become concerned about and respond to a message that conveys a threat 
to these cherished things63,64. By contrast, people who do not relate in any way to a place 
being referred to will most likely remain unaffected by proximised messages. 
This second perspective challenges the expectation that bringing climate change 
physically closer always translates into more concern and more action. According to this 
perspective, proximising can in principle increase the extent to which people are concerned 
and willing to take action. But this effect should only occur when people care in one way or 
another about the proximal place.  
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Reacting to threats  
The previous section argued that proximised climate change messages should only 
increase levels of concern and the motivation to act if the place in question is important to 
people. Somewhat paradoxically, a third line of reasoning suggests that messages could fail to 
LQFUHDVHSHRSOH¶VPRWLYDWLRQWRDFWRQFOLmate change exactly when these messages are 
personally relevant. Different lines of research within psychology suggest that threatening 
information can be overwhelming when it is made personally relevant. This feeling of being 
overwhelmed can then trigger defensive reactions ± which are helpful to reduce negative 
feelings but do not reduce the threat itself11,69,70.  
There are several arguments that support the idea that climate change may be 
perceived as a potentially overwhelming threat. First of all, even though some positive 
consequences of climate change are expected (e.g., increased agricultural yields in northern 
latitudes), globally and on the whole, negative consequences are likely to significantly 
outweigh any positive benefits. This view is not only presented in scientific reports71,72 but 
also in news coverage of climate change73,74. This negative view is amplified by frequent 
portrayals of climate change as an impending catastrophe73,74. More importantly, the 
conception of climate change as a negative issue corresponds with the typically negative 
associations and feelings individuals report with regard to climate change6,7,17. This negative 
connotation of climate change implies that proximising this issue increases the salience of 
possible threats to the place in question (including everything that constitutes this place). To 
the extent that people care about at least some things or people that are threatened by 
proximal climate change, proximising seems to be an effective strategy to make people realize 
that these things are at stake. Evidently, this realisation will most likely conflict with what 
people also desire, for instance to know that they, their friends and family members, their 
homes and possessions are safe, and evoke a state of aversive arousal69,70.  
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So far, this analysis is consistent with the rationale underlying the proximising 
approach: to increase action via higher levels of (emotional) concern16,22,27,28.While people 
may indeed change their behaviours when confronted with a threat, however, there are several 
reasons why they may respond to climate change in ways other than increased efforts to 
mitigate and adapt. For example, individuals may not always be clear about what they can do 
to effectively mitigate climate change75,76. As a consequence, they may decide not to act at 
all11. Further, people may not believe their actions can make a difference3,59, or may find that 
the required actions and changes are too difficult59,77,78. Thus, if people have insufficient 
confidence in the effectiveness of possible responses or their personal ability to act, behaviour 
change is unlikely11,12,79,80. In this case, people need to employ other strategies to deal with 
the unpleasant feelings that proximal climate change entails11,69,70.  
2QHVROXWLRQZRXOGEHWRFKDQJHRQH¶VH[Lsting expectations and desires70. For 
example, to stop caring about RQH¶VRZQVDIHW\RUthe safety of close others would resolve the 
conflict between safety concerns and knowing that climate change may adversely affect these 
important referents. However, because people are typically motivated to retain their existing 
beliefs81, and because safety concerns for self and close others are a strong motivational 
forces, using strategies to defend their beliefs is more likely than abandoning or revising 
them. For instance, people may intentionally avoid threatening information about climate 
change82 or avoid making inferences about its personal relevance83. Another strategy that 
people may use to deal with threatening messages is to question or even reject them70,81 (i.e., 
they may adopt sceptical beliefs about climate change; see for example ref. 84). 
Last but not least, when people see climate change action as undesirable or when they 
feel that they are not able to mitigate or to adapt, they may deny responsibility for causing 
FOLPDWHFKDQJHHJ³0\FRQWULEXWLRQWRFOLPDWHFKDQJHLVPLQLVFXOH´RUIRUDFWLQJRQ
FOLPDWHFKDQJHHJ³,W¶VXSWRODUJHFRPSDQLHVDQGJRYHUQPHQWVWRDFW´85. Importantly, 
defensive reactions to climate change are not mere assumptions derived from related fields of 
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research. There is empirical evidence suggesting that people use these strategies when they 
are confronted with threatening information about climate change3,6,84,86±88. In other words, it 
is suggested here that the use of proximising as a strategy may exacerbate existing tendencies 
to use these defensive strategies among people who care about the things, people or places 
threatened by proximal climate change. 
Note that negative physical consequences to things people care about (e.g., the 
integrity of the natural environment or the safety of friends) are not the only way in which 
proximal climate change can threaten people and trigger defensive reactions. Climate change 
may also threaten psychological resources such as a positive self-view and the desire for 
stability. 7KHLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUSHRSOH¶VVHOI-view may not be obvious at first. But consider, for 
example, that the FRQWULEXWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLRQVWRFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGtheir potential 
role in mitigating climate change is emphasized in campaigns, media coverage, and even in 
films HJ³$QInconvenient TUXWK´. It can therefore be assumed that people are aware that 
their own past and current behaviour contributes to the negative consequences threatening 
their proximal environment. Sharing responsibility for causing harm implies that one is an 
irresponsible, uncaring, and morally questionable person89,90. These implications may not 
only lead to unpleasant feelings such as guilt80,91, they also conflict ZLWKSHRSOH¶VGHVLUHWR
maintain a positive self-view92.  
Related to this, proximising climate change implies increased pressure for individuals 
to take personal actions. However, many responses to climate change may be interpreted as 
sacrifices and displeasing changes from individuals (e.g., lifestyle changes such as reducing 
the consumption of goods or spending holidays at home rather than at remote destinations3,59). 
Moreover, and maybe even more importantly, changing the practices and habits that cause 
greenhouse gas emissions is also difficult59 (see also ref. 77), and something that people feel is 
beyond their individual capacity3. Thus, VWLFNLQJWRRQH¶Vroutines and habits is more 
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appealing than taking on difficult and inconvenient lifestyle changes and less problematic for 
the self than acknowledging the harmful consequences of onH¶VDFWLRQV89,90.  
'HIHQVLYHQHVVDURXQGRQH¶VVHOIDQGRQH¶VFKRLFHVLVQRWRQO\UHOHYDQWZKHQLWFRPHV
to the personal self. Many people exhibit a similar defensiveness and reluctance to change 
with regard to the place93,94, the social group90, and the society95 they are part of. People are 
generally attached to the socioeconomic status quo and motivated to justify and maintain it, a 
tendency that becomes stronger when people are faced with a threat88,95. It is therefore likely 
that focusing on the negative consequences of proximal climate changeDQGRQH¶VRZQUROHLQ
producing these90, will also bolster the tendency to adhere to the status quo and to reject 
appeals for change. This tendency might be further stimulated when RQH¶VVRFLRHFRQRPLF
system is being criticised for its role in causing climate change88, for assuming (co-) 
responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change would be difficult to reconcile with the 
YLHZRIRQH¶s system as just, fair, and beneficial88.  
Thus, climate change can also pose a psychological threat96, for example in the form 
of guilt80,91, image threats to oneself92WRRQH¶VVRFLDOJURXS90, and to RQH¶VVRFLRHFRQRPLF
system88,95. Similar to physical threats from climate change, these psychological threats are 
likely to cause discomfort and to trigger coping strategies intended to reduce negative 
feelings69,70. These coping strategies can in principle EH³FRUUHFWLYH´LQQDWXUHWKDWLVthey 
can lead people to make amends for what they feel guilty for,91,97 or to change the aspects of 
the self98 or RQH¶VVRFLDOJURXS90 that are causing the discomfort. However, various 
preconditions need to be met for these corrective responses to kick in (e.g., people need to 
assume responsibility90,98,99, be aware of response options75,76 and believe in their 
efficacy3,11,59). Moreover, the difficulties and inconveniences associated with the steps 
required to tackle climate change3,59,77 suggest that embracing steps to deal with it will not 
necessarily be the preferred reaction of most people who receive proximised climate change 
messages. In essence, this means that the threats proximising poses to psychological 
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resources69 may also trigger defensive strategies such as avoiding information about climate 
change or denying its relevance87. 
In sum, this third perspective suggests that focusing on proximal climate change 
increases the saliency of negative consequences for a specific place. To the extent that one 
cares about the place in question, or about the people who are implicated by that place, the 
outlook of negative impacts will elicit a state of aversive arousal69,70. Because this aversive 
arousal is unpleasant, people are motivated to reduce it69,70. In line with the rationale 
underlying the proximising approach16,22,27,28, people would ideally respond with increased 
mitigation and adaptation efforts and thereby tackle the threat itself. However, because people 
may see the changes required from them as ineffective, inconvenient, or too demanding3,59, 
they may turn to other strategies that effectively reduce unpleasant feelings11,69,70 but do not 
contribute to alleviating the negative consequences of climate change. 
 Thus, somewhat paradoxically, when people realise that climate change threatens 
things they care about, instead of taking measures to protect these things, they may 
alternatively ignore the threat and risk losing what they hold dear. In other words, increasing 
the personal relevance of climate change by highlighting its proximal consequences can 
backfire.  
 
Close to home  
Despite being a plausible and common sense approach WRLQFUHDVHLQGLYLGXDOV¶
motivation to act on climate change57, bringing climate change closer psychologically has so 
far not lived up to expectations24,52. Clearly, more research is needed in this area to form a 
coherent picture of the consequences of proximising climate change. However, in the absence 
of further empirical tests ± and as a framework for stimulating these ± we offer three 
theoretical perspectives as possible explanations for why this strategy may fall short of its 
promise.  
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)LUVWUDWKHUWKDQGLUHFWO\DIIHFWLQJSHRSOH¶VPRWLYDWLRQWRDFWSroximising changes 
how people mentally represent climate change and what information they base their decisions 
on. Second, proximising only works if the places and things (encompassing people, flora, 
fauna, and symbolic meanings) at risk from proximal climate change mean something to 
people ± a precondition that cannot be taken for granted. Third, even if the things that are at 
risk from proximal climate change mean something to people, proximising will only increase 
action on climate change if people think of possible actions as acceptable, feasible, and 
effective. 
The key lesson to be learned from these perspectives is simple: proximising climate 
change is complex. Focussing on proximal climate change is likely to trigger various 
psychological processes that are expected to interact with SHRSOH¶VH[LVWLQJthoughts, beliefs, 
and preferences. At best, proximising will be successful in encouraging people to take steps to 
mitigate or adapt to climate change. At worst, this strategy will lead to defensive reactions 
such as increased scepticism about the reality and relevance of climate change. In between 
these options, it is also possible that proximising will change the frame of reference through 
which people think about climate change, but with no consequence for their level of action ± 
thus rendering this strategy inert. 
Despite these possibly undesired outcomes, our analysis is not suggesting that 
researchers and communicators should abandon the idea of motivating action through 
proximising climate change. Each one of the three perspectives presented above suggests that 
under some circumstances the proximising strategy can be an effective tool to increase action 
on climate change. However, to effectively employ this strategy, its complexity must be 
acknowledged and more research efforts need to be undertaken to better understand the 
individual and situational factors that facilitate and impede the success of the proximising 
approach.  
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In this sense, we hope that our reflections will contribute to more differentiated ± and 
thereby more realistic ± expectations about how proximising DIIHFWVSHRSOH¶VPRWLYDWLRQWR
act on climate change. This, in turn, should not only open promising avenues for future 
research but also help to avoid disappointment about unsuccessful research projects and 
ineffective interventions. 
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